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Market based solutions to alleviate poverty have become increasingly popular in recent years. 
Unfortunately, there are very few examples of profitable businesses that market socially useful goods 
in low-income markets and operate at a large scale.  This article examines in-depth three case studies of 
multinational firms that tried to market unquestionably useful products -- clean water, eyeglasses, and 
nutritious yoghurt -- to the poor, and did not succeed commercially.  We also discuss two positive 
examples of profitable BOP ventures: mobile phones and detergents.  The overarching lesson we draw 
from the case studies is that developing strategies for marketing socially useful goods to the poor, far 
from triggering a revolution in business thinking, requires firms to get back to the basic principles and 











Market based solutions to alleviate poverty have become increasingly popular in recent years.  
CK Prahalad (2004) in his much acclaimed book Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid argues 
that private companies, especially large multinational companies, can make significant profits 
by marketing to the people living at the ‘bottom of the pyramid’ (BOP), and simultaneously 
help eradicate poverty.  The BOP proposition of ‘doing well by doing good’ is, of course, very 
appealing and has attracted much attention.  At the same time, this proposition is 
controversial in the current management literature.  Karnani (2007a) argues that the BOP 
opportunity is a “mirage” and that its logic is “riddled with fallacies.”  Jaiswal (2008:88) 
contends that the “accounts of corporations succeeding at the BOP sometimes strain 
credulity.”  Based on the very examples used by Prahalad (2004), Karnani (2007a) posits that 
the so-called BOP activities are either profitable but not socially beneficial, or socially virtuous 
but not profitable. 
 
Unfortunately, there are very few examples of profitable businesses that market socially 
useful goods in low-income markets and operate at a large scale (Monitor Group, 2009).  
There are, of course, many examples of businesses that profit by exploiting the poor. The 
poor are vulnerable by virtue of lack of education (often they are illiterate), lack of information, 
and economic, cultural and social deprivations.  For example, Banerjee and Duflo (2007) 
show that the poor spend a “surprisingly large” fraction of their income on alcohol and 
tobacco.  Many companies exploit this tendency and make significant profits from the sale of 
alcohol and tobacco to the poor (Karnani, 2009).  Products such as tobacco are easy to 
analyze: they are profitable businesses that are socially bad for the poor, and clearly do not fit 
the BOP proposition. 
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There are other BOP examples that, while not as socially egregious as tobacco, are still of 
dubious social value.  “The problem with the consumer-focused BOP approach is that it does 
not differentiate between priority and non-priority areas” (Jaiswal, 2008:94).  An interesting 
example is the commercially successful whitening cream ‘Fair & Lovely’ marketed by 
Unilever.  Hammond and Prahalad (2004:36) cite this as a positive BOP example and 
contend that a poor woman now “has a choice and feels empowered because of an 
affordable product formulated for her needs.”  Unilever seems to be both profitable and 
helping the poor.  Karnani (2007b:1355) demonstrates that it is “unlikely Unilever is fulfilling 
some ‘positive social goal’ and might even be working to the detriment of a larger social 
objective” by helping to sustain, even if unwittingly, sexist and racist prejudices in society.  At 
a minimum, the poor woman buying Fair & Lovely is diverting expenditures from more 
essential products such as nutrition and health care.  Profitable ‘BOP businesses’ that fail to 
alleviate poverty are just normal profit-seeking businesses under a flimsy disguise. 
 
The real challenge is to design market-based solutions for alleviating poverty, which implies 
profitable businesses that provide socially beneficial products and services to the poor that 
genuinely improve the quality of their lives.  Unfortunately, there are very few positive 
examples here.  After an extensive survey of 270 market-based solutions in India, the 
consulting firm Monitor Group (2009: 27) concluded “only a small handful – mostly well 
publicized ones like Grameen Bank and Aravind Eye Care – attained a scale sufficient to 
transform a ‘business model’ into a ‘solution’.”  It is true that both these examples, Grameen 
and Aravind, are ‘well publicized’ – almost every BOP article or book cites these examples.  
But, it is ironic, and instructive, that even both these examples are not-for-profit organizations, 
and cannot be classified as commercial successes nor as market-based solutions.   
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In this paper we focus on BOP businesses that are unquestionably socially virtuous and 
investigate how to develop profitable strategies in that context.  But, instead of examining 
positive examples only, we choose to study in-depth three BOP initiatives that have not been 
commercial successes, at least not yet, and derive conceptual lessons from these case 
studies.  We then test our conclusions on more successful BOP ventures.  Our three case 
studies involve multinational companies – Procter & Gamble, Essilor, and Danone – that 
launched BOP initiatives with aspirations of creating large-scale profitable businesses 
marketing socially useful goods to the poor.  Up to now, all three have failed to generate 
adequate profits. They have significantly downscaled their initial plans and converted their 
efforts into small experimental operations. 
 
Examining these three cases in-depth yields several interesting insights on the key success 
factors for BOP initiatives. The BOP literature is full of exhortations calling for a ‘revolution’ in 
business thinking; Prahalad (2004:10) even asks for a “change in our genetic code.”  The 
overarching lesson we draw from the case studies is that, far from triggering a revolution in 
business thinking, developing BOP strategies requires firms to get back to the basic principles 
and rules of economics and business. The context is different in BOP markets from more 
affluent markets, but durable business principles are still an effective guide to strategy 
development.  Context changes, the logic of business does not change. The generous and 
well-intentioned social objectives of BOP initiatives must not hide the fact that these 
opportunities present tough economic and strategic challenges.  The desire to do good should 
not blind managers to the realities of underlying economic forces that determine business 
success and failure.  
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We first very briefly present an outline of the three case studies.  We argue that business 
success should be measured by economic profits, not just accounting profits, let alone 
‘financial sustainability’.  We then present four lessons we draw from the case studies.  The 
first lesson is that unmet needs of the poor do not necessarily constitute a market.  A ‘market’ 
can exist only if there are buyers willing and able to pay a price that covers the total cost of 
production, including the opportunity cost of capital used.  Unfortunately, due to the very 
meager income of the poor, markets for many socially useful goods simply do not exist.  The 
second lesson is that firms will have to dramatically reduce costs, even if it implies reducing 
quality, in order to develop BOP markets.  This does not imply selling shoddy or dangerous 
products.  To profitably serve the poor, firms need to make the cost-quality trade-off 
appropriately in order to make the products affordable by the poor.  The third lesson is that 
creating efficient distribution networks is critical to the success of BOP initiatives.  Vertical 
integration into proprietary distribution channels is probably not a good solution.  The final 
lesson is that trying to achieve multiple social objectives makes it even harder for BOP 
initiatives to succeed.  It is difficult enough to combine profitability with selling socially useful 
goods to the poor without adding more constraints, such as environmental sustainability. 
Finally, we discuss two positive examples of profitable BOP ventures: mobile phones and 
Nirma (an Indian producer of detergents), and demonstrate how these success stories have 
avoided the pitfalls discussed above. 
 
Case Studies 
The three case studies described below are based on data from published sources and 
private conversations with senior executives from the companies.  Where no source is cited in 
this paper, case study data is based on private conversations. 
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Essilor and Vision Correction 
About  2.3 billion people in the world suffer from poor vision due to refractive error, a common 
disorder in the eye that blurs vision.  The solution for refractive error is simple and cost 
effective: eyeglasses.  Nevertheless, it was estimated 564 million people who need 
eyeglasses do not have access to them (Moses and Karnani, 2009).  In the mid-2000, only 
7% of the Indian population actually wore spectacles, whereas about 65% of the population 
needed spectacles (Garrette, et al, 2008). 
 
Essilor International designs, manufactures and sells organic (i.e. plastic) optical lenses in 
over 100 countries all over the world.  With revenues of about $4.2 billion and a global market 
share of about 30%, Essilor dominates the ophthalmic lens industry. 
 
In 2005, Essilor teamed up with Indian not-for-profit eye hospitals Aravind and Sankara 
Nethralaya to launch a BOP initiative targeting the Indian rural poor (Garrette, et al, 2008).  
The project started  by operating four “refraction vans”, i.e. mobile optician shops, which 
visited villages to prescribe and sell corrective spectacles to poor people suffering from visual 
disorders.  This innovative approach solved the problem of the rural poor not having feasible 
access to optician shops.  A pair of eyeglasses was priced less than 200 rupees (€3 or $4).  
Essilor was considering scaling up the operation; the company estimated that 1000 vans 
would be needed to reach the 600,000 villages of India.  In 2010 however, Essilor operates 8 
refraction vans only.  After trying to franchise the vans to local opticians, the company has 
decided to operate them on its own, and to limit future investments to the amount of cash 
generated by the existing vans.  Even with donations/sponsorships, the project hardly earns 
its cost of capital. 
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P&G and Clean Drinking Water 
In 2002, 18% of the world’s population (1.1 billion) did not have access to safe, affordable, 
sustainable source of drinking water (WHO and UNICEF, 2005).  Lack of clean drinking water 
is not just an inconvenience; it has major health implications.  1.6 million people die every 
year due to diarrheal diseases (including cholera), which are waterborne diseases.  Over 90% 
of these deaths occurred among children below 5 years of age.  Other diseases caused by 
lack of clean drinking water include schistosmiasis, trachoma, intestinal Helminths, Hepatitis 
A, and arsenic poisoning. 
 
Procter & Gamble (P&G) first researched new water-purifying technologies in 1991.  In 1995, 
P&G formed a partnership with the US Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to 
develop a low-cost water purification technology to deliver commercial and public health 
benefits (Hanson and Powell, 2009).  After some failed attempts, these efforts culminated in 
the launch in the year 2000 of ‘PuR: Purifier of Water’, a powder that, when mixed with water, 
produced clean drinking water.  Using PuR required only basic household equipment: a 
bucket and tightly woven cloth; the end result was water that was visibly clean and did not 
leave an unpleasant aftertaste.  The branded product PuR was sold in a small sachet, which 
would purify 10 litres of water, and was priced at US$ 0.10 per sachet.  The product had 
much commercial potential, especially since its manufacture required significant proprietary 
knowledge that prevented unauthorized imitation. 
 
Following positive test marketing in Guatemala, P&G rolled out the product PuR on a larger 
scale in 2001.  These larger-scale tests, however, only yielded market penetration rates of 
about 15% in the Philippines and 5% in Guatemala.  In 2002, P&G decided to stop the large-
scale tests to learn more from further test marketing in Morocco and Pakistan.  In 2004 P&G 
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launched PuR on a mass scale in Pakistan.  However, repeat purchase rates hovered around 
5%; the scale up in Pakistan had failed. 
 
In 2005 P&G officially abandoned attempts to commercialize PuR, and transformed the 
project into a corporate social responsibility programme (Hanson, 2007).  P&G announced its 
new non-commercial approach and its decision to sell PuR at $0.04 per sachet, the cost of 
production, to non-profit humanitarian organizations.   
 
Grameen-Danone and Child Nutrition 
Good nutrition, especially in the case of children, is the cornerstone for survival, health and 
development.  Undernourished children have lowered resistance to infection and are more 
likely to die from common childhood ailments.  Frequent illness saps the nutritional status of 
those who survive, locking them into a vicious cycle of recurring sickness and faltering 
growth.  In 2007, 23% of children in the world under the age of five years suffered from 
malnutrition, as measured by WHO standards; in Bangladesh, the comparable number was 
41% (UNICEF, 2009). 
 
In 2006, Danone, a large food and beverage multinational company, teamed up with 
Grameen Bank, the pioneering micro-finance organization in Bangladesh, to create Grameen 
Danone Food Ltd (GDFL), with the mission of alleviating “poverty by implementing an 
innovative business model which will bring healthy and wholesome food to the poorest 
everyday” (Danone Communities, 2009).  GDFL developed a yoghurt product branded 
‘Shoktidoi’ (which means strengthening yoghurt) specifically designed to alleviate child 
malnutrition.  Shoktidoi is rich in proteins and calcium, and also contains living bacteria which 
help fight diarrhea, a common disease in Bangladesh.   
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As a ‘social business’, GDFL was set up to generate enough revenues to sustain itself but not 
to earn economic profits nor to pay dividends.  The partners agreed to re-invest all the cash 
generated back into the business.  The expected profits were 3% of sales over the long term.  
The venture’s first plant was supposed to start operating in early 2007, to break even in 2008, 
and to run at full capacity in 2010. The long term plan was to expand all over Bangladesh by 
building fifty factories. 
 
The first GDFL factory is smaller, simpler, and less automated than Danone’s usual plants; 
the GDFL plant has a capacity of 3000 tons per year compared to 400,000 tons at Danone’s 
biggest dairy plant in Europe. The yoghurt Shoktidoi was introduced at a price of 5 takas 
($0.07) per 80 gram serving.  In 2008, the price was changed to 6 takas per 60 gram serving. 
GDFL’s initial plan was to distribute the yoghurt only through female sales representatives – 
Shokti ladies – who would sell the product door-to-door. 
 
The sales volume has been disappointing and the Shokti ladies distribution strategy has not 
worked as expected. GDFL sold only 150 tons of yoghurt in 2008 and expected to sell 500 
tons in 2009, compared to capacity of 3000 tons.  Sales through urban grocery stores 
targeted at the middle class account for 80% of sales, and only 20% of its sales are through 
Shokti ladies to the rural market.  Danone executives now believe that urban sales are 
needed to subsidize the rural sales.  GDFL had an operating loss of 21 million takas ($0.3 
million) in 2008, and is expected to generate roughly the same level of loss in 2009 even 
though volumes are supposed to grow.  GDFL has nevertheless decided to build a second 




How to measure profits? The ‘cost of capital’ issue 
A lot of misunderstanding on the BOP business opportunity results from confusion with the 
notion of “social business”, as put forth by the Nobel price winner Muhammad Yunus (2007). 
Yunus founded the Grameen Bank and other “social business” based on the theory that the 
poverty problem can be solved by creating what he calls “not-for-loss” businesses, by analogy 
to ‘not-for-profit’ initiatives. While traditional not-for-profit initiatives might not be sustainable in 
the long run because they depend on donations, not-for-loss businesses are viable because 
they cover their operating costs.  But, the problem with not-for-loss businesses is that they still 
do not cover the opportunity cost of capital. 
 
Yunus deliberately ignores the cost of capital, whereas private profit-seeking firms cannot 
afford to do so.  The objective of private firms is not just accounting profits, but rather 
‘economic profits’, defined as accounting profits minus the opportunity cost of capital. The 
ability to generate accounting profits is not enough; economic profitability is necessary to 
make a project truly viable in the long run, and scalable by attracting additional capital.  
Regardless of the social (or environmental) benefits of a project, if this project generates 
return on investment lower than the cost of capital, it is doomed to remain under-funded and 
to operate on a small scale, because it will have access mostly to donations, and not to free-
market equity funding. ‘Investors’ in social businesses are really acting as philanthropists. 
 
Vikram Akula, who runs SKS, a $250m microfinance firm in India, challenges Yunus’s view in 
the following way: “When I started SKS ten years ago, [...] I established it as a nonprofit with 
lots of small donations from friends and relatives. I had certainly admired Grameen Bank’s 
group-lending model, but wasn’t a big fan of Yunus’s theory that microfinance firms should be 
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merely self-sustaining companies –what he calls “social businesses”. I felt that if the industry 
were going to provide the estimated $300bn of credit needed by the poor, it would have to tap 
larger, commercial capital markets –and that meant structuring our business so that investors 
could expect significant returns.”  (Akula, 2008; p.55). 
 
A clear distinction should be made between businesses that are to create shareholder wealth, 
“social businesses” that are to supposed to cover their operational costs but do not create 
shareholder wealth, and charities which require ongoing cash infusions to cover their 
operating costs. Charities need donations to survive; social businesses need donations to 
grow; businesses do not need donations.  Private businesses try to create shareholder 
wealth, social businesses try to maintain wealth, and charities are designed to voluntarily re-
distribute wealth. 
 
One way to support initiatives for which the return on capital is not expected to be sufficient is 
to fund them as social businesses through separate foundations. For example, Danone has 
created the ‘Danone Communities’ fund in order to decouple such social business initiatives 
like the Grameen-Danone joint venture from its mainstream business operations. The Danone 
Communities fund invests in social business initiatives as well as in financial securities. Its 
overall return is supposed to just beat the risk-free rate of return. The concept is therefore that 
shareholders do not donate the money; they entrust the money to the fund.  However, these 
shareholders are, in effect, making a charitable donation of the difference between the cost of 
capital and the return they get.  It is worth noting that, in 2009, only 10% of Danone 
Communities’ resources are allocated to social businesses, the rest being invested in risk-free 
placements. Even when setting the profitability target significantly lower than the cost of 
capital, attractive social business opportunities seem to be lacking at the BOP!  
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Social businesses are not consistent with the concept of ‘market based solutions to poverty’.  
Surely, market based approach implies that companies achieve economic profits, not just that 
they do not have an operating loss. 
 
The unmet needs trap 
The unmet needs of the poor at the BOP are often presented as offering a huge untapped 
business opportunity (Prahalad, 2004).  For example, half of the world population on average 
needs to wear spectacles.  But in India the penetration of eyeglasses is dramatically lower at 
only 7% because the poor do not have access to eyeglasses.  It is often concluded from this 
that there must be a huge business opportunity for a firm to market eyeglasses to the Indian 
BOP.  Werhane et al (2010: 52) argue for the distinction between size and opportunities for 
business (italics in the original).  The current market size is small, but the future opportunities 
are big.  There are many people, at least a billion, living in abject poverty with many unmet 
needs – this constitutes a business opportunity. 
 
The major flaw in this logic is that an unmet need does not constitute a market.  A market 
exists only to the extent that there are buyers willing and able to pay a price higher than the 
total costs, including the opportunity cost of capital, of the sellers.  The perceived consumer 
value must exceed the price; and the buyers have to be willing and able to pay this price.  A 
firm is willing and able to sell at this price only if its revenues exceed its total costs.  The size 
of a market and the price of the product are determined by the intersection of the demand and 
supply curves.  If the supply and demand curves do not intersect, there will be no market, 
even if there is an unmet need.  For example, there is a need for homes that utilize only solar 
energy.  But the price consumers are willing to pay for solar energy is too low compared to 
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cost of manufacturing solar panels and energy storage devices – there is an unmet need but 
no market.  This is an old and basic principle in economics, but it applies equally to BOP 
opportunities as to any other market.  The basic rules of economics have not been repealed 
for the poor.  The poor clearly have unmet needs for eyeglasses, clean water and nutritious 
food; but, our three case studies demonstrate that Essilor, P&G and Danone are struggling to 
find business opportunities here. 
 
Assessing the size of the unmet need is easy; but that should not be confused with an 
estimate of the potential market opportunity.  For example, assessing the size of the unmet 
need for eyeglasses in India is quite easy.  A starting plausible assumption is that the 
percentage of the population having refractive problems is the same in India as other 
countries for which detailed data is available.  The number of eyeglasses sold in India is also 
readily available.  Hence, it is fairly easy to assess the size of the unmet need for eyeglasses.  
But, estimating the size of the potential market is far more difficult.  Assuming a price of $4 
per pair of glasses, how many poor Indians will be able and willing to buy eyeglasses is a very 
difficult question to answer.  Conducting market research in the BOP context is significantly 
more difficult than in more affluent and developed markets.  The logistics of reaching the poor 
is more demanding and expensive.  The poor are often not well informed about the product 
and cannot easily answer a questionnaire about future willingness to buy the product.  There 
are few comparable (or reference) products from which one can extrapolate by analogy.  
Assessing the size of the unmet need for eyeglasses in rural India is easy; assessing the size 
of the market opportunity for eyeglasses is extremely difficult. 
 
A more extreme reason why BOP markets are small is that many poor people are not well 
informed or not well educated enough to fully appreciate the value of the product or service 
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being offered.  For example, a survey conducted by the Monitor Group (2009:43) in India 
found that 60% of the respondents would not switch to purified water “even if it was free”.  It is 
difficult to understand such responses given the evidence that water borne diseases are a 
major cause of poor health among the poor.  In a similar vein, Ramke et al (2007) found that 
55% of rural women in a survey in Timor-Leste were unwilling to pay even $1 for eyeglasses; 
this in spite of the significant impact of eyeglasses on worker productivity and quality of life. 
 
Confusing unmet need and market size leads to disappointing performance. For example, 
while child nutrition is obviously a salient need in Bangladesh, the BOP market for GDFL’s 
Shoktidoi yoghurt was grossly overestimated. Since its launch in February 2007, the factory 
has never operated at more than 25% of its production capacity, even though the plant is 
dramatically smaller than Danone’s traditional units in developed countries.  This is even 
more disappointing since 80% of the current sales are to the urban middle class rather than to 
the rural poor, the primary target of the original project. 
 
The size of the BOP market, like any other market, can grow bigger if the supply or demand 
curves shift outwards.  The demand curve can shift out if the income of the BOP increases, or 
if the poor assign a higher perceived value to the product due to getting better educated about 
its benefits.  Educating the poor about the product benefits is expensive, and increases the 
costs of the firm taking on this task.  The supply curve can shift out if technological innovation 
significantly reduces costs, such as in mobile telephony.  Unfortunately, such shifts in the 
supply curve have not occurred for the great majority of the BOP unmet needs, and certainly 
not for our three case studies involving eyeglasses, clean water and child nutrition. 
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Moral indignation and righteous sense of social injustice are appropriate responses to the 
extent of unfulfilled basic human needs of the poor, such as clean water, sanitation, nutrition, 
shelter, energy, basic health care and education.  But, if the market size is too small 
compared to the unmet need, market based solutions are not a feasible way to alleviate 
poverty.  Philanthropic responses – traditional charity organizations or ‘social businesses’ – 
will work better.  The problem with that is ‘scalability’.  Unfortunately, the scale of philanthropy 
– even taking into account such large donors as Bill Gates and Warren Buffet -- is too little 
compared to the immense size of the unmet needs.  Governments must play a critical role in 
this context. 
 
Private companies trying to implement market based solutions to alleviate poverty by 
marketing socially useful goods to the BOP have to expand the market.  The key issue is 
designing the product in such a way as to make the price truly affordable by the poor. 
 
The affordability trap 
BOP proponents argue that since the poor account for the majority of the world’s population, 
their aggregate buying power is in fact large even though their individual income is very low 
(Prahalad, 2004). In addition, the poor do buy “luxury” items and they do value brands if they 
are given access to them, and they pay “high” prices because of distribution inefficiencies. As 
a consequence, there is a potential to provide them with low cost products by efficiently 
organizing the supply chain.  This view urges multinational corporations to target the BOP 
market with their existing products, or adaptations of the existing products without sacrificing 
quality. This often results in marketing products that are in fact much too expensive and not 
affordable by the poor (Karnani, 2007a).  
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There are two lessons to be learnt here.  Firms should not overestimate the purchasing power 
of the poor.  Second, firms should adjust the cost-quality trade-off much more significantly to 
conform to the lower purchasing power of the poor. 
 
Overestimating purchasing power 
A surprisingly common mistake is that firms and researchers convert income of the poor using 
purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates, but convert product prices using financial 
exchange rates.  This mistakenly makes products seem more affordable by the poor.  Since 
financial exchange rates are about 3-5 times higher than PPP exchange rates for most 
developing countries, this has a big impact on the apparent affordability of products.  
Prahalad (2004) makes this mistake throughout the book. 
 
Many researchers in the development field define the poor using the World Bank’s $2 per day 
standard, which was formulated in PPP terms at 1993 prices; this translates to about Rs. 30 
per day in India, using the approximate PPP rate of Rs. 15 per dollar (without adjusting for 
inflation).  Stating the price of a sachet of PuR at $0.10 makes it seem that the sachet costs 
5% ($0.10 divided by $2.0) of the poor person’s daily income.  But since the price was 
converted at the financial exchange rate of Rs. 45 per dollar, the sachet actually costs 15% of 
the poor person’s daily income.  It is not surprising that the repeat purchase rates for PuR 
were very low. 
 
Another cause of overestimation of the purchasing power is that firms do not fully appreciate 
the consumption patterns of the poor.  Basic necessities account for a large fraction of their 
meagre income, not leaving much room for other expenditures.   
 
 18
Essilor justifies setting the price of eyeglasses at Rs. 200 on the grounds that spectacles are 
priced at around one week of base salary in developed countries.1  A European can afford to 
spend 200 Euros, about 2% of his annual income on eyeglasses. Essilor uses appropriate 
exchange rates and takes into account the low income of the poor by considering prices as a 
fraction of income; even then it ends up overestimating the market potential.  A poor Indian 
cannot afford to spend the same percentage of his annual income on eyeglasses since a 
much larger fraction of his income is needed for more ‘necessary’ needs. The poor Indians 
spend about 80% of their income on food, clothing and fuel alone (Gangopadhyay and 
Wadhwa, 2004), making it difficult to buy a product even as useful as eyeglasses.  This partly 
explains why the proportion of prescriptions that convert into actual purchases in Essilor’s 
BOP initiative is below 40%.   
 
Cost-quality trade-off 
In order to make products affordable by the poor, firms need to achieve large price and cost 
reductions.  A significant improvement in technology could reduce costs dramatically, as for 
example in telecommunications.  Unfortunately there have not been such technological leaps 
in most other product categories.  It is thus often necessary to reduce quality in order to 
reduce costs significantly; the challenge is to do this in such a way that the cost-quality trade-
off is acceptable to poor consumers (Karnani, 2007a).  All the three companies in our study 
fail to achieve the appropriate cost-quality trade-off and end up trying to market products that 
are too expensive and not affordable by the poor. 
 
Shoktidoi is a dairy product and its storage and transportation requires refrigeration, which is 
obviously a problem given the climate and infrastructure in Bangladesh.  Marketing a dry or 
                                                 
1 Rs. 200 per week is consistent with the poverty line of Rs. 30 per day discussed earlier. 
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stable grocery product for child nutrition that does not require refrigeration would have been 
much less costly.  GDFL’s choice of yoghurt was probably driven by the fact that Danone had 
divested its biscuit and grocery businesses several years ago, and dairy products is one of its 
main lines of business now.  Rather than starting with the problem – child nutrition – and 
finding the most cost-effective solution, Danone starts with the product it markets in affluent 
countries and tries to adapt it to the BOP markets.  The other two companies, P&G and 
Essilor fall into the same ‘adaptation trap’. 
 
Essilor’s BOP initiative sold organic lenses, which are more expensive (and better quality) 
than simple glass lenses, probably because Essilor does not manufacture glass lenses 
anymore.  The Essilor refraction vans are staffed by an optometrist and a technician who 
perform an eye-test for each patient and then prescribe and deliver customized spectacles.  
This is an expensive business model.   An alternative and cheaper approach would be to sell 
pre-manufactured ‘reading glasses’ that do not require individual customization.  The 
appropriate strength of eyeglasses can be chosen based on a simple test such as looking at a 
newspaper or threading a needle, and does not require a trained optometrist.  Even in 
developed countries, many people buy reading glasses in grocery stores without needing a 
prescription.  The limitation, of course, is that reading glasses are useful only for presbyopic 
(or long-sighted) people.  Of patients requiring eyeglasses, about 75% suffer from presbyopia, 
which is an almost inescapable consequence of aging.  Thus, a very simple low cost solution 
would be effective for 75% of the patients.  There might even be potential to sell pre-
manufactured eyeglasses for myopic (or near-sighted) patients; this obviously implies lower 
quality and less customized eyeglasses, but at a much lower cost.  Realizing that it was falling 
into the ‘adaptation trap’ by offering to the BOP market the same degree of customization as it 
does in more affluent markets, thus making the product too expensive for the poor, Essilor 
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recently decided to allow the refraction vans to also distribute ready-made glasses without 
prescription.  These low-range products, which can be sold at Rs 50 ($1), are outsourced 
from external low cost providers.  In parallel, Essilor has increased the price of its prescription 
spectacles from $4 to $5, which resulted in a 40% decrease in volume.  Thanks to these 
changes in pricing and product mix, in addition to cost reduction initiatives, Essilor’s BOP 
operation has finally turned profitable.  However, Essilor is unwilling to commit new capital to 
the project. 
 
A major cause of the commercial failure of PuR was that the product was too expensive at 
$0.01 per litre of water purified.  P&G used flocculation2 technology that is superior to simple 
chlorination of water.  A bottle of locally produced hypochlorite solution that treats 1000 litres 
of water costs only $0.10, and is effective at removing most bacteria and viruses that cause 
diarrheal disease (CDC, 2008).  Some users object to the taste and odour of chlorine.  There 
are also concerns about the potential long-term carcinogenic effects of chlorination by-
products.  The poor unfortunately face a choice between a superior product that they cannot 
afford and a less effective product with negative side-effects that they can afford.  The CDC 
considers chlorination a viable option depending upon local conditions because of the 
immediate and larger benefits of reducing diarrheal diseases.  A different low cost approach is 
community filtration plants that sell purified water at $0.0025 per litre, which is one-fourth the 
price of PuR (Monitor Group, 2009:41).  P&G too falls into the ‘adaptation trap’.  Rather than 
starting with the problem – clean drinking water – and finding the most cost-effective solution 
affordable by the poor, P&G starts with the business model it uses in affluent markets.  As 
part of its expansion efforts in the late 1990s, P&G purchased Recovery Engineering Inc. and 
                                                 
2 Flocculation refers to the chemical process by which fine particles are caused to clump together into 
floc, which can then be readily filtered from the liquid. 
 21
its PuR brand water treatment appliances.  These products were designed primarily for 
consumers in the United States who wanted to improve the taste and health safety of tap 
water. 
 
Firms targeting the BOP markets need to emphasize the appropriate cost-quality trade-off 
from the perspective of the poor.  A simple or minor adaptation of the business model from 
affluent markets usually results in products that are too expensive and not affordable by the 
poor.  A significant reduction in quality might be necessary.  Selling low quality products to the 
poor might seem unethical.  But, selling products at the appropriate cost-quality trade-off is 
not only ethical, it is socially virtuous.  If the poor cannot afford customized eyeglasses, they 
are better off with approximately correct pre-manufactured spectacles than no eyeglasses at 
all.  The appropriate reference point for quality is not the standard prevailing in affluent 
markets, but rather the status quo in BOP markets, which usually is unfulfilled basic needs.  A 
low quality product is better than no product at all. 
 
The dilemma, from the perspective of the multinational firm is that at the appropriate cost-
quality trade-off, the price and the margin may be too low to earn significant profits.  PuR 
does not generate enough sales volume at the price of $0.01 per litre to be commercially 
viable.  The market for hypochlorite solution has very low entry barriers, many local small 
producers and is not profitable enough to attract P&G.  This is the central dilemma of 
marketing socially useful goods to the poor.  The core challenge of market based solutions to 
poverty is finding business models that sell socially virtuous products to the poor and are 
simultaneously profitable for private companies. 
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Moreover, the new business model required to target the poor consumers may conflict with 
the established strategy and brand image of the firm.  It is unlikely that P&G would risk its 
global brand image by marketing a water chlorination product with potential long-term 
carcinogenic effects even if the immediate gains from reducing diarrheal diseases were 
greater on the balance.  Essilor’s core business all over the world uses the distribution 
channel of opticians and optometrists to sell value-added, customized eyeglasses.   Essilor 
has been understandably reluctant to market pre-manufactured, standardized eyeglasses 
through direct distribution to the poor; this conflict might be confusing and upsetting to the end 
consumers and the distribution channels, and endanger its core business. 
 
The distribution trap 
In many BOP initiatives, creating efficient and viable marketing and distribution support 
networks is an even bigger challenge than reducing the manufacturing cost of the product.  
Distribution networks to serve the poor, especially in rural areas, do not exist or are very 
inefficient.  Creating socially responsible distribution is essential for the success of market 
based solutions to poverty (Vachani and Smith, 2008).  At the same time, creating a 
distribution network to reach the poor might be too expensive and contribute to the 
commercial failure of the project. 
 
Many multinational companies launching BOP initiatives are forced to create distribution 
networks from scratch in order to reach the poor rural consumers.  This creates difficulties 
that are often underestimated. The strategic trend among large companies in developed 
countries has been to de-integrate their activities: unbundle the value chain, outsource what 
they can, and focus on their core business.  Multinational firms are often ill equipped to 
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forward integrate into distribution, especially in the unfamiliar environment of the BOP in 
emerging economies. 
 
Essilor’s core strategy is to sell all its lenses through its own prescription laboratories, but not 
to integrate forward into retail that remains the job of independent opticians or chains of 
optical shops.  Essilor’s traditional clients are opticians, not patients.  When considering the 
BOP opportunity in India, Essilor first went to Indian opticians and tried to get them engaged 
in the project. However, most of them rejected the idea, arguing that it was too costly, too 
demanding and unprofitable to serve the rural poor.  Essilor then decided to forward integrate 
into retail distribution by operating refraction vans, basically mobile optician shops.  With this 
move, Essilor entered a business that the local specialists deemed unprofitable, and was 
beyond the company’s core competencies; it also became a low price competitor to its 
traditional customers. 
 
GDFL did not initially consider supermarkets and grocery stores to market Shoktidoi because 
they operate only in urban areas and serve the middle class, rather than the BOP population.  
Building on Grameen’s microfinance experience (micro-loans are distributed by ‘Grameen 
ladies’), GDFL decided to create a team of independent female sales representatives, Shokti 
Ladies, who sell Shoktidoi door-to-door, directly to the consumers. The company believed the 
Shokti Ladies were the only relevant distribution channel.  
 
Danone executives now acknowledge that the Shokti Ladies strategy has been a failure. 
GDFL started with 60 Shokti Ladies in February 2007. They all left in April 2007 when 
production stopped at the factory. A new hiring campaign was launched and the number of 
ladies peaked to 273 in February 2008. But it dropped to 17 in September 2008 when 
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demand decreased dramatically, following a price increase that was triggered by a sudden 
rise in the price of milk. By December 2008, GDFL was left with only 37 ladies.  
 
The best performing Shokti Ladies sold 100 yoghurt packages a day, which is half of the 
expected sales level.  Selling Shoktidoi is not a full-time job; Shokti Ladies can not make a 
living working for GDFL alone.  In 2008, when GDFL realized that the Shokti Lady scheme 
was not sustainable, it decided to market Shoktidoi through small general stores in parallel.  
In June 2009, shops accounted for 80% of sales of Shoktidoi.  By using this distribution 
network, GDFL is marketing to the urban middle class much more than to the rural poor.  
GDFL has in fact created a traditional consumer goods business that subsidizes the loss-
making BOP operation.  Shoktidoi prices are significantly higher in urban areas: 12 takas per 
80 gram serving in the capital Dhaka, compared to 6 takas per 60 gram serving in rural areas.  
Moreover, urban sales are supported by traditional marketing techniques targeting middle 
class consumers, such as TV advertising campaigns and product range extensions (e.g. 
flavored yoghurts and drinks).  Thanks to this new revenue stream, GDFL forecasts to sell 
1500 tons of yoghurt in 2010 (i.e. 50% of the factory’s capacity) and to break even in 2011 
(Danone Communities, 2009).  Meanwhile, it has re-launched its rural marketing initiative: by 
October 2009, 560 shokti ladies were in business, with a new management and a revised 
training and compensation scheme.   
 
Proprietary, exclusive, one-product distribution channels do not enjoy economies of scope 
and are very expensive, and unlikely to be the solution to the distribution challenge.  This is 
part of the cause of the lack of profitability of the GDFL and Essilor ventures.  The exclusive 
one-product distribution channel of Shokti Ladies is infeasible because of very high costs: no 
economies of scope, and inadequate economies of scale due to low volumes.  Essilor 
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understood this problem and tried to de-integrate from distribution by franchising its refraction 
vans to opticians. Potential franchisees immediately asked for permission to use the vans to 
distribute other products than spectacles equipped with Essilor lenses – they immediately 
realized the need for economies of scope.  In addition to reading glasses, some opticians also 
suggested selling non-competing items such as cell phones.  Essilor management has been 
reluctant to accept these proposals. 
 
Some corporations try to solve the problem by partnering with local non-profit institutions that 
benefit from a strong legitimacy and are already in contact with clients. Danone teamed up 
with the Grameen Bank which is highly respected in Bangladesh thanks to Muhammad 
Yunus’ unquestionable reputation. They got mixed results however when trying to replicate 
the “Grameen Lady” scheme. Essilor piggy-bagged on the existing “tele-ophthalmology” 
operations of two hospital chains, Aravind and SN, which are also highly respected for their 
ability to provide the poor with affordable cataract surgery. In both cases, these alliances were 
instrumental in making “pilot” operations happen by taking advantage of existing non-profit 
distribution channels.  
 
While alliances with non-profit organizations may be instrumental to ignite operations, they 
cannot be relied on to scale up the business.  As discussed earlier, social businesses have 
problems attracting enough capital to grow the business to a large scale.  Aravind and 
Sankara Nethralaya were able to partner with Essilor to initiate the project with four refraction 
vans.  It is unlikely they would have been able to participate equally if the project were to 
expand to 1000 vans to cover all of India.  If the project is to grow as a purely commercial 
venture, then it has to overcome the ‘distribution trap’. 
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The multiple objectives trap 
We have argued above that trying to combine socially useful products with firm profitability is 
a major challenge.  BOP initiatives often make this problem even harder by adding other 
social and environmental objectives. 
 
GDFL started out with ambitious environmental sustainability objectives.  The initial plan was 
to package Shoktidoi in cups made of Poly Lactic Acid (PLA), which is manufactured from 
corn and is bio-degradable.  The plant would re-cycle PLA waste to produce bio-gas which 
would be used for lighting and heating purposes.  Delivery would be done by cycle rickshaws 
to avoid fuel consumption.  GDFL also planned to encourage customers to bring their own 
cans to refill yoghurt rather than buy pre-packaged yoghurt.  Most of these environmental 
friendly plans now have been abandoned because they increased the complexity and cost of 
the project.  GDFL now uses polystyrene (an oil derivative) packaging. 
 
GDFL also wanted to create jobs for poor women as a social objective of the venture.  This 
was consistent with the Grameen philosophy of developing and empowering women through 
micro-entrepreneurship as way to fight poverty.  As discussed above, the Shokti Ladies 
scheme too has proven to be problematic. 
 
Because of the alliance with eye care hospitals Aravind and Sankara Nethralaya, the Essilor 
venture also had the social objective of diagnosing eye diseases.  All “eye camps” therefore 
involved two vans, operated by six people: Essilor’s “refraction van” focused on mounting and 
selling spectacles while the hospital’s “tele-ophthalmology van” performed eye disease 
diagnosis. However, the staff included only an optometrist (not an ophthalmologist), whose 
training is focused on refractive error, not on eye diseases. When the optometrist suspected 
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an eye disease (in particular eye cataracts which is a major cause for blindness in India), the 
optometrist could route the patient to the “tele-ophthalmology van” to perform an eye fundus 
(which is the interior of the eye) examination.  The technician conducting the eye examination 
was in contact with an ophthalmologist in the base hospital using a satellite communication 
link, hence the “tele-ophthalmology” concept.  This, of course, increases the cost and 
complexity of the initiative.  It might have been better to have a narrower focus only of 
correcting refractive problems without adding other public health objectives. 
 
Multiple objectives – such as profitability, generating employment, environmental 
sustainability, public health – are often in conflict, at least in the sense of drawing on a pool of 
limited resources and impose trade-offs.  The danger is that attempting to achieve too many 
objectives simultaneously leads to the project’s commercial failure and demise, and none of 
the objectives being achieved.  Perfection is the enemy of the good.  Much of the strategy 
literature emphasizes the value of ‘focus’.  BOP initiatives are well advised to focus on 
ensuring the product being marketed is in fact useful to the poor, and that the project is 
economically profitable to enable scaling up. 
 
Positive Examples 
While not common, there are some positive examples of profitable BOP ventures that provide 
socially beneficial products and services to the poor.   We will discuss two such examples 
here, mobile phones and Nirma (an Indian producer of detergents), and demonstrate how 




Mobile telephony is probably one of the best, and well-publicized, examples of successful 
BOP ventures.  In 1995, there were more phone lines in Manhattan than in all of Sub-Saharan 
Africa.  Today, penetration of mobile phones in Africa is 28%.  More people in China and India 
own mobile phones than in North America and Europe combined (Rashid and Elder, 2009).  
In India, about 45% of BOP households own a mobile phone, a penetration rate greater than 
that for radios, and second only to televisions (LIRNEasia, 2009). 
 
The main perceived benefit of mobile phone usage among the poor is improved 
communication with family and friends.  In addition, several studies have focused on the 
positive impact of mobile phones on the livelihoods of farmers, fishermen, and small 
entrepreneurs (see Rashid and Elder, 2009).  There is also much enthusiasm about the 
potential for mobile phones to deliver other services to the poor, such as public health, 
financial services, education, government services, and disaster warnings (Lehr, 2008) 
 
It is easy to argue that the poor need mobile phones.  The industry has successfully avoided 
the 'unmet needs' trap and 'affordability' trap by reducing the total cost of ownership (TCO).  
According to Nokia research, the TCO across 77 developing countries was $10.88 per month 
in 2008, down by 20% from 2005 (Nokia, 2009).  Nokia believes that a TOC of $5 or less per 
month would enable the poor to purchase a mobile phone.  In 2008, 12 countries had 
achieved this $5 target, including India, China, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Indonesia.   
 
The TOC is comprised of three elements: handset (7%), service (79%), and taxes (14%).  
Technological advances, the learning curve and scale economies are largely responsible for 
the tremendous decrease in cost of the handsets and mobile services over the last few 
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decades.  The worldwide mobile communications industry association GSMA's Emerging 
Market Handset program achieved its goal of reducing the price of entry-level handsets to 
less than $30 in 2006 (GSMA, 2006).  The cost structure of mobile phone service has two 
important characteristics: 1) high fixed cost and low marginal cost, and 2) services sold to 
affluent people and to poor people use the same capital-intensive infrastructure.  This implies 
that it is economically profitable to cross-subsidize and sell services to the poor even at very 
low prices, so long as the price is above marginal cost.  According to a study conducted by 
the consulting firm BDA with chamber of commerce Ficci in India, the top 9% of mobile phone 
users contribute 29% to the industry revenues and 45% of the profits; the lower end of the 
pyramid -- 71% of subscribers -- contributes a mere 27% to revenues and only 15% to profits 
(Jain, 2009). 
 
The industry has further reduced the cost, and especially the marginal cost of serving the 
poor, by selling prepaid phone services.  This reduces the phone operator's costs involved in 
credit checks, billing, and bad debts; instead of paying interest on working capital the firm 
earns interest on the prepaid balances.  Virtually all BOP customers are prepaid subscribers. 
 
In addition, in many developing countries, there is a flourishing market for used mobile 
phones that further reduces the entry price for poor consumers.  An innovative approach to 
reducing costs has been the shared-access model, whereby one person or organization owns 
the mobile phone subscription and rents airtime to others.  Grameenphone has formalized 
this on a large scale through its Village Phone program, which makes microloans to poor 
entrepreneurs to buy a mobile phone, an external antenna (for better reception), and a 
discounted subscription.  The Village Phone program has more than 362,000 operators in 
Bangladesh, and has been replicated in several other countries. 
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The poor have low costs because their usage of value-added, and more expensive services 
such as financial payments, government services, downloading music, email, Internet 
browsing is "extremely low" (LIRNEasia, 2009).  In Bangladesh, 94% of the poor phone users 
further lower their cost by sending and receiving 'missed calls', that is calling a number and 
deliberately hanging up before the other person picks up the call.  Missed call can be used to 
send a pre-negotiated message (such as 'pick me up now'), relational sign (such as 'I am 
thinking of you'), and request a call back.  Depending on the number of rings, different 
messages can be conveyed.  This practice is growing rapidly throughout developing countries 
and is known by several names: beeping, flashing, pranking, and fishing.  This is of growing 
concern to network operators since missed calls burden the infrastructure and do not 
generate revenues (Donner, 2007). 
 
The industry has clearly avoided the affordability trap and created a real market for mobile 
phone services.  The industry has also avoided the distribution trap by selling prepaid cards 
through a large variety of retail shops including general merchandise kiosks.  It is even 
possible to electronically buy prepaid credits and to transfer credits from one phone to 
another, further facilitating distribution.  Even though mobile phones can be used to deliver 
other services (such as public health) that would be socially valuable, the industry did not 
weigh down the BOP venture with multiple objectives. 
 
Nirma 
Unfortunately, the tactics discussed above that reduce costs in mobile telephony are not 
transferable to most other industries, especially the significant improvements in technology.  
The only other way to reduce costs is to reduce quality -- the challenge is to do this in a way 
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that the cost-quality trade-off is acceptable to the poor consumers.  A good example of this 
logic is the low-price detergent introduced by Nirma in India.  In 1969 Karsanbhai Patel 
started a small business to sell a cheap detergent powder he had formulated in his kitchen.  
The quality of Nirma was clearly inferior to that of Surf, the product marketed by Hindustan 
Lever Limited (HLL).  “Nirma contained no ‘active detergent’, whitener, perfume, or softener.  
Indeed tests performed on Nirma confirmed that it was hard on the skin and could cause 
blisters” (Ahmad and Mead, 2004).  Nirma also spent less on advertising and promotions than 
Hindustan Lever.  Largely because of this Nirma sold at a price about one-third the price of 
Surf.  Nirma rapidly became a success.  In 1977, Surf had a market share of 31% compared 
to 12% for Nirma.  Ten years later in 1987, the market share of Surf had come down to 7% 
while that of Nirma had gone up to 62%.  By reducing the price, Nirma had succeeded at 
creating a new market: detergent targeted at the BOP.  Reacting to Nirma, Hindustan Lever 
entered this market in 1987 with a new brand: Wheel. 
 
The primary common element between these two successful BOP examples is the 
tremendous emphasis on cutting costs and hence reducing prices.  It seems the poor like 
inexpensive, low-quality products.  This is not because they cannot appreciate or do not want 
good quality.  They simply cannot afford the same quality products as the affluent; so, they 
have a different price-quality trade-off.  They are even willing to put up with a detergent that 
sometimes causes blisters! The standards to judge what is acceptable have to be from the 
perspective of a poor person who before could not afford any detergent, and not from the 
perspective of an affluent person who routinely buys a high-quality detergent.   
 
Nirma's "extremely simple distribution system stood in sharp contrast with HLL's multilayered 
system"  (Ahmad and Mead, 2004).   When Patel started the company, to reduce costs, he 
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did not employ a field sales force nor owned a distribution network, and negotiated prices with 
trucking suppliers on a daily basis.  This reinforces our earlier discussion about carefully 
managing distribution channels to reach the BOP. 
 
Conclusion 
Companies, academia, civil society and governments have devoted increasing efforts and 
attention to generating market based solutions to alleviate poverty.  In spite of this, there are 
very few examples of profitable businesses that market socially useful goods in low-income 
markets and operate at a large scale.  Combining social virtue with profitability while 
achieving scale is a major challenge.  The desire for a positive outcome should not blind 
managers and policy makers to the difficulty of the challenge. 
 
This paper examined in-depth three BOP ventures that have underperformed and two 
success stories, and extracted conceptual lessons. The dominant lesson we draw from the 
case studies is that developing BOP strategies requires firms to get back to the basic 
principles and logic of economics and business: focused objectives, understand the 
customers, and appreciate the role of economies of scope and scale.  The biggest difference 
between BOP and affluent markets is the obvious but under-emphasized fact that the poor 
have very low purchasing power.  Designing the business model to serve BOP markets has to 
start with this basic insight rather than a minor adaptation of the business model successful in 
affluent markets. 
 
There is no fortune at the bottom of the pyramid.  Marketing socially useful products to the 
poor offers only limited business opportunities.  However, companies that make the relevant 
trade-offs will profit from seizing these opportunities. The current situation of BOP businesses 
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might be analogous to the “New Economy” fad in the late 1990s.  There were then many 
dot.com gurus calling for a change in the business paradigm, and myriads of start-up firms 
launched new “business models” that denied basic economic principles.  However, after the 
bubble burst, a few winners did emerge, such as Amazon and Google.  Tomorrow’s BOP 
champions are probably hidden somewhere in the current experiments that firms are 
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